*Africa Command: Opportunity for Enhanced Engagement or the
Militarization of U.S.-Africa Relations?*

 

/Dr Wafula Okumu/

Head, African Security Analysis Programme, Institute for Security
Studies, Pretoria, South Africa

 

/August 2, 2007/

 

/Testimony given to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee
on Africa and Global Health/

 

*/Introduction/*

Thank you Chairman Payne and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee
on Africa and Global Health for giving me this opportunity to share my
views on the proposed Africa Command (Africom). These are personal views
and do not reflect those of my employer, the Institute for Security
Studies (ISS). My name is Wafula Okumu and I presently head the African
Security Analysis Programme at the ISS in Pretoria, South Africa. Our
work is devoted to tracking, monitoring and analysing threats to human
security in Africa. Among the many variables that we track are military
matters, particularly those related to the African peace and security
agenda and the various contributions being made by the international
community to build the capacity of Africa to implement this agenda. I
would like to start my presentation with a brief background on
U.S.-Africa relations, then give you an overview of the objectives of
Africom, as presented in Africa, and analyse why I think Africom was set
up before sharing with you how it is perceived in Africa, and explain
why Africans are reluctant to embrace the proposed command. I will then
share with you the possible misconceptions behind Africom and what can
be done to overcome them before concluding my remarks.

 

*/Background/*

 

Until recently, Africa has not been strategically attractive to the
U.S.  This is partly because U.S. interests in Africa had not been
clearly defined and it had no bureaucratic structure to manage those
almost nonexistent interests. For a long time, the strategic thinking
has been that the U.S. has no compelling interests in Africa and do
not want anybody else to have any, either. However, whenever a
non-Western nation or idea made its way into Africa, the U.S. got very
nervous. This is what happened from the 1960-1990, when the Soviet Union
tried to spread its communist ideology to Africa. Today, many think the
U.S. is very nervous of Chinese economic penetration into Africa.
Americas concern is that the Chinese are trying to control the
continents natural resources and gain influence over it. The U.S. is
also worried that radical Islamism is a dangerous idea that could
germinate in poorly and badly governed states of Africa. Africom is
being sold as an answer to these threats. Until the enunciation of
Africom, the continent had been haphazardly divided into three U.S.
commandsEuropean, Central and Pacific.  In order to understand this
state of affairs we need first to understand the basis of U.S. foreign
policy towards Africa.

 

/Basis for Understanding U.S. foreign policy towards Africa/

U.S. foreign policy towards Africa has been variously referred to as
either benign neglect or manifest destiny. In other words, these
postures have defined or driven U.S. relations with Africa. Despite
changes of U.S. administrations since 1960, when most African countries
started gaining independence, the substance has always remained the
same. Only the styles of various administrations have changed. As we
shall see later, when given a choice between supporting the liberation
struggles of the African people or bolstering its NATO allies, the U.S.
easily chose the latter. On the other hand, it has sent Peace Corps
volunteers to remote villages to assist in improving agricultural
production while at the same time erecting trade barriers against
products of these local farmers. It is this principle of manifest
destiny that seems to be embodied in Africoms objectives and stated
mission.

 

*/Africoms Stated mission/*

        Prevent conflict by promoting stability regionally and
eventually prevail over extremism by never letting its seeds germinate
in Africa.

        Address underdevelopment and poverty, which are making Africa a
fertile ground for breeding terrorists.

         view the people, the nations and the continent of Africa
from the same perspective that they view themselves.

        Build the capacity of African nations through training and
equipping African militaries, conducting training and medical missions.

        Undertake any necessary military action in Africa, despite its
non-kinetic nature such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

 

*/Why the U.S. really wants to set up Africom/*

Despite the above stated objectives, there are many reasons why the U.S.
wants to set up Africom. First, the U.S. has become increasingly
dependent on Africa for its oil needs. Africa is currently the largest
supplier of U.S. crude oil, with Nigeria being the fifth largest source.
Instability, such as that in the Niger Delta, could significantly reduce
this supply. The U.S. National Intelligence Council has projected that
African imports will account for 25% of total U.S. imports by 2015. This
oil will primarily come from Angola, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
and Nigeria. Nigeria, Africas largest oil producer, has now overtaken
Saudi Arabia as the third largest oil exporter to the U.S.  The
importance of the African oil source can be gleaned from the fact that
in 2006, the U.S. imported 22% of its crude oil from Africa compared to
15% in 2004. President Bush appeared to have African oil supplies in
mind during his 2006 State of the Union Address, when he announced his
intention to replace more than 75% of (U.S.) oil imports from the
Middle East by 2025. Continuing unrest in the Middle East has increased
the urgency for the U.S. to build a security alliance with Africa in
order to achieve this goal.

 

Second, Africa is an unstable region with badly governed states that can
only manage their affairs, particularly security-related, with outside
assistance. Since September 11, 2001, U.S. foreign policy has heavily
focused on preventing and combating global terrorist threats. The events
of 9/11 changed the way the U.S. views and relates to the rest of the
world. Likewise, the foreign policies of Western powers have
increasingly been militarised to secure and defend Western interests.
Terrorism has been identified as one of the biggest threats to these
interests. Africom is expected to stop terrorists being bred in Africas
weak, failing and failed states from attacking these interests.

 

It is widely held in the West that failing and failed states in Africa
create opportunities for terrorists to exploit. Among the targets of
these terrorists are Western interests such as oil sources and supply
routes. Improvement of African security would inevitably promote U.S.
national interests by making it less likely that the continent could be
a source of terrorism against the United States.

 

Third, one of the critical challenges facing Africa and the UN is
training, equipping and sustaining troops in peace missions. African
armies need training in peacekeeping. It is proposed that through
Africom, African troops will be trained and aided to keep the peace in
African conflict zones. This should come in handy when it is considered
that all African Union-led peacekeeping operations deployed so far have
encountered monumental problems. The most recent deployment, African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), is on the verge of folding because of
a lack of financial and logistical support, as well as trained troops to
keep a peace that is not there. Furthermore, it is stated that the
medical assistance given through Africom could reduce the high
prevalence of HIV in African militaries.

 

All things considered, it could be seen that the whole idea is, to a
large extent, a bureaucratic issue within the U.S. government (State
Department vs the Pentagon) on the best way of promoting American
interests in Africasecuring investments and oil sources, fighting off
Chinese competition and waging the war against terrorism.

 

*/What Africans think of Africom/*

Despite its altruistic sounding objectives Africom is yet to be warmly
and widely embraced in Africa; as the following comments indicate:

        Africom would destabilise an already fragile continent and
region, which will be forced to engage with U.S.  interests on military
terms.Michele Ruiters, /Business Day/ (Johannesburg)

        Ironically, Africom was announced as Chinese President Hu
Jintao was touring eight African nations to negotiate deals that will
enable China to secure oil flows from Africa. Editorial, /Daily Nation/
(Nairobi), 8 February 2007

        Africom is aimed at influencing, threatening and warding off
any competitors by using force. Editorial, /The Post/ (Lusaka), 12
April 2007.

        African countries should wake up after seeing the scars of
others (Afghanistan and Iraq). /Reporter/ (Algiers).

        Mohamed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Minister of State and Foreign
Affairs, has questioned why there was no proposal for an anti-terror
cooperation with Algeria when the country was experiencing high levels
of terrorist violence in the 1990s.

        How can the U.S. divide the world up into its own military
commands? Wasnt that for the United Nations to do? What would happen if
China also decided to create its Africa command? Would this not lead to
conflict on the Continent? Abdullahi Alzubedi, Libyan Ambassador to
South Africa.

        Increased U.S. military presence in Africa may simply serve to
protect unpopular regimes that are friendly to its interests, as was the
case during the Cold War, while Africa slips further into
poverty.Nigerian Journalist Dulue Mbachu.

        People on the street (in Africa) assume their governments have
already had too many dealings with the U.S. in the war on terror at the
expense of the rule of law. The regimes realise the whole idea is very
unpopular.Rachid Tlemchani, University of Algiers Professor.

 

These and many other similar comments expressed during the visits of
U.S. officials, and in newspaper editorials and meeting on African peace
and development have led a State Department Official to conclude that:
Weve got a big image problem down there. Public opinion is really
against getting into bed with the U.S. They just dont trust the U.S.

 

*/Why Africans are reluctant to embrace Africom/***

The coldness with which Africans hold Africom was displayed in July when
Gen Kip Ward, the newly appointed first commander of Africom, was denied
a meeting with the South African minister of defence, Mosiuoa Lekota,
during his visit to the country to drum up support for the planned
command. There are a number of reasons why Africans are reluctant to
embrace Africom.

 

First, any country hosting the command will be criticised for violating
Africas common positions on African defence and security, which
discourages the hosting of foreign troops on the African soil. In
particular, it is thought, such troops could be used to undermine the
Continents Non-Aggression Pact, solemn declaration on common African
defence and security, and other positions on hosting foreign bases in
Africa.

 

Second, Africans vividly remember that colonialism was preceded by
philanthropic missionaries who came to fulfil Gods Will of rescuing
Africans from the clutches of barbarism. To paraphrase Kenyattas
allegory, when the Whiteman came to Africa, he was holding a Bible in
one hand and asked us to close our eyes and pray. When we opened our
eyes after the prayer, his other hand was holding a gun and all our land
was gone! Africas colonial history was characterised by military
occupations, exploitation of its natural resources and suppression of
its people. After testing decades of independence, these countries are
now jealously guarding their sovereignty and are highly suspicious of
foreigners, even those with good intentions.

 

Third, when Africans reflect on the continents relations with the U.S.,
they see ambiguity, neglect, and selective engagement. For instance,
during the period of decolonization, the U.S. did not openly support the
UN decolonization initiatives, particularly when these were not aligned
with its Cold War positions. Often, the U.S. was reluctant to support
anti-colonial and anti-apartheid liberation movements in Southern Africa
and colonial Portugal, a member of NATO. U.S. forcefully reacted to
African regimes that forged close relations with the Soviet Union and
China, while aligning closer to anti-Communist African despots who were
anti-democratic and had horrendous human rights records. With this
historical background, Africom might be considered in Africa if its
objectives did not appear to be based on the principle of manifest
destiny of saving Africa. The proposal will be seriously considered
if it primarily seeks to strengthen the capacity of the African Union
and other African organizations to implement Africas development, peace
and security agendas.

 

Fourth, Africans are not comfortable dealing with the military in
matters related to their development and sovereignty. Africans are
concerned that the establishment of Africom might do more harm than
goodthe poised hammer that makes everything suddenly look like a
nail, in the words of /Esquire/ magazine. They would be much more
comfortable dealing with American diplomats, USAID and Peace Corp
volunteers rather than the U.S. Marine. Africans are nervously concerned
that Africom will sanction the militarization of diplomacy and severely
undermine multilateralism on the continent. Africans have consciously
adopted multilateralism as a common approach to addressing the
continents problems and confronting its challenges. Africom seems to be
a unilateral approach that would be counter to the current trend towards
unity on the continent. Consequently, the establishment of Africom must
secure an African consensus otherwise it would bring new and grave
threats and challenges to the continents peace and security agenda. The
issue of foreign military presence on the African soil is in violation
of this agenda.

 

Additionally, the U.S. should bear in mind that following the emergence
of other players in Africa; any initiative aimed at the whole continent
cannot be unilaterally conceived and implemented. Although it is
factually acknowledged that the U.S., as the most powerful global
military and economic power, has the will and capacity to undertake
unilateral actions, there are severe limitations and far-reaching
consequences for the unconsidered use of power.  The U.S. engagement in
the Middle East has proved that the policy of consolidating democracy in
the region, destroying al-Queda and removing abhorrent regimes from
power can fail despite all its seemingly good intentions.

 

Fifth, the launching and the aggressive promotion of Africom are taking
place at the same time that Africa is debating the Union Government
proposal. There are feelings, as expressed in a recently held
consultative meeting of the African Union PCRD in Lusaka, Zambia, that
Africom is an American attempt to ensure that the aspiration for African
Unity is checked by a heavy U.S. military presence on the continent.
This concern is based on the track record of American military
intervention in Africa. The image of U.S. military involvement in Africa
becomes more confusing when one looks at the hard security concerns of
Africa. Many Africans are asking why American troops were not deployed
to prevent or restrain the Rwandan /genocidaires./ Why the U.S. forces
remained anchored safely off the coast of Liberia when that country, the
nearest thing America ever had to an African colony, faced brutal
disintegration in 2003? Why the U.S. has not supported the AU Mission in
Somalia (AMISOM) and instead supported the Ethiopian intervention
through airpower from CJTF-HOA stationed in Djibouti? Is the U.S. really
interested in addressing the felt security needs of Africans, or does
its proposed military presence foreshadow the kind of destruction we
have seen recently in Somalia? Is Africa to become merely another
theatre of operations in which winning the hearts and minds forms an
essential component of a security driven agenda? Why should ordinary
Africans welcome an American presence that will create African targets
for extremists where none existed, and add an unwelcome dimension to
already complex local conflicts? Why is Washington not able to do
something to address Africas needs by modifying its trade policy? If
the U.S. is really committed to participating in the continents
development why not support the New Partnership for Africas Development
(NEPAD)? This would surely have a greater developmental impact, if
improving the livelihoods of the people is what the U.S. wants; maybe
this has not been clearly stated as such in the previous definition of
Africas needs.

 

Sixth, Africans were never consulted during the conceptualization of
Africom. Rather Africom was announced and has been presented as a /fait
accompli/. Africans are presently experiencing the exuberance of
self-importance and confidence to drive their own destiny. There is a
prevailing mood on the continent to reassert African self-worth and
self-determination. This is why consultation has become a common
clich on the continent.

 

Seventh, there is also a concern that Africom will suffer from mission
creep by being transformed from engagement in humanitarian missions to
an interventionist force, as was the case with Operation Restore Hope in
Somalia in 1992. The change of the humanitarian objectives could also
come about due to the nexus of energy, poverty, and terrorism. Despite
the oil wealth of African countries, 23 West African nations are ranked
bottom on the UN human development index on poverty. The test case for
this mission would be the Niger Delta region where an insurgency has
been taking place since 2004, when unemployed youths took up arms to
demand an equitable distribution of Nigerias oil wealth. Besides using
violence, sabotage and kidnapping tactics, these youths under the
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), have shut off
approximately 711,000 barrels per day (bpd) of Nigerias output of 2.5
million bpd. There is a strong feeling that if such activities interfere
with U.S. oil supplies in Africa, there is a high likelihood that
Africom could be used to protect U.S. interests.

 

Eighth, militarization of U.S.-Africa relationsAfricans are wary of the
U.S. record in Iraq and concerned that the Pentagon is taking the lead
role in the promotion of U.S. interests. Establishment of Africom could
be seen as President Bushs approach of using military force to pursue
U.S. strategic interests. Africom will not only militarise U.S.-African
relations but also those African countries in which it will be located.
This could have far-reaching consequences, as the presence of American
bases in these countries will create radical militants opposed to the
U.S. and make Americans targets of violence. 

 

Ninth, the mixed messages being relayed to Africa by the U.S. government
have compounded the confusion and heightened the suspicions Africans
have of Africoms objectives:

 

        In 1995, the DOD in its /U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan
Africa/ stated that the U.S. had very little traditional strategic
interest in Africa. But Theresa Whelan, the Assistant Secretary for
Defence, has recently argued that Africa is providing tens of thousands
of U.S. jobs, possesses 8% of the worlds petroleum; and it is a major
source of critical minerals, precious metals and food commodities.

        Ryan Henry, the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for
Policy and Pentagon pointman on Africom, has stated that its purpose is
not to wage war but to work in concert with (U.S.) African partners for
a more stable environment in which political and economic growth can
take place. However, Gen Wald minced no words when he stated that: Id
like to have some forward bases in Africa. The world has changed and we
are going to make our security. The Halcyon days are over.

        General Bantz Craddock, the EUCOM Commander, told journalists
in Washington in June that protecting energy assets, particularly in
West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, would guide the focus of Africom. 
Gen Craddock added that Africom will enable countries (in West Africa)
to improve their security of any type of productionoil, natural gas,
minerals.

        These intentions are reflective of the bold recommendations
made by Vice President Dick Cheneys National Energy Policy Development
Group, in 2001, that the Bush administration make(s) energy security a
priority of (U.S.) trade and foreign policy.  One year later, the Bush
administration rolled out its West Point Doctrine that essentially
stated that the U.S. would not allow a major economic, political or
military competitor to emerge.

 

Almost all African countries are reluctant to host Africom; some have
made it clear that they do not want anything to do with it while others
have even warned that it should not be stationed in any country
neighbouring them. These countries are aware that the generosity of
providing military advisors can easily turn into sending of conventional
forces and a full-blown military intervention. For instance, Africom
could provide Nigerian armed forces training to combat the Niger delta
insurgence, which could later be upgraded to limited special operations
to rescue American hostages and hunt down those who have attacked
American economic interests.

 

Different regions in Africa have their respective concerns. For
instance, the states of North Africa fear that their sovereignty could
be easily undermined, similar to what happened to Libya in 1987 when it
was bombed in the aftermath of the Berlin disco attack in which it was
implicated. Most North African countries are also unable to engage too
closely with the U.S. because of the Middle East policy that is widely
perceived as too pro-Israel.

 

Furthermore, as a result of the U.S. military estimate that about a
quarter of all foreign fighters in Iraq are from Africa, mainly Algeria
and Morocco, there is a likelihood that Africom could be used to block
these terrorists from moving to the Middle East. Additionally, these
countries are worried that Africom could open the door to Israeli
military and intelligence presence in Africa.

 

African governments lack the political spine to accept a permanent U.S.
presence. Egypt, one of the closest American allies, is out of the
picture because it is to remain in CENTCOM and is generally considered
as an Arab rather than African nation. Kenya would be reluctant, as it
has previously been targeted by transnational terrorism because of its
closeness to the West and hosting Western interests, both military bases
and businesses. Only President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf has
enthusiastically offered Liberian territory to be used for the
establishment of Africom headquarters on the basis that it would
undoubtedly have a most beneficial effect on the West Africa sub-region,
as well as the entire continent.

 

*/Misconceptions of Americans/*

In view of the above, it is apparent that Americans have a number of
misconceptions that need to be addressed before prescribing ways of how
to address African concerns about Africom.

 

1. /Muslims in Africa are attracted to radical ideology promoting
violence against Western interests./ This is not true, as Muslims are
desperate to have education for their children so that they can compete
in the globalized world. They want the basics of life like other people
and there are many of them who would prefer to live in the U.S. rather
than Saudi Arabia if given a choice.

 

2. /Terrorism is a threat to African interests/. Terrorism is not
generally regarded in Africa as a major threat to the livelihoods of the
people. Addressing it is not a top priority in security matterscompared
to urban violence, pastoralist conflicts, proliferation arms and state
violence. Africa is being terrorised by hunger, diseases (HIV/AIDS,
malaria, etc), lack of life basics, oppressive laws, bad leadership,
poor governance, unfair terms of international trade, foreign debt,
conditionalities of international financial institutions, etc.  Africans
are afraid that Africom, in the guise of development assistance and
combating terrorism, could be used to destabilise African countries,
whose leaders and governments the U.S. does not get along with.

 

3. /Africa is incapable of addressing its problems/.  Africans have been
trying since 2000 to come up with strategies to address its
underdevelopment, violent conflicts, and many threats to human
security.  These efforts have seen the formation of the New Partnership
for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU). The AU has
adopted an ambitious conflict prevention, management and resolution
agenda that it is implementing through structures such as the Peace and
Security Council. Other relevant structures include an African Standby
Force (ASF) that would be based on 5 regional brigades. This is where
the U.S. should play a critical role in building the capacities of these
structures to promote peace and security in Africa.

 

4. /Africom will enhance (American) efforts to bring peace and security
to the people of Africa and promote (American and African) common goals
of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in
Africa/, according to President Bush. Some Africans think Africom would
instead bring to them military development, military health, military
education, military democracy and military economic growth. U.S. bases
have produced a dependency culture in places such as the Philippines
that increased poverty and disadvantaged women. U.S. military bases have
brought unstable and uneven development to areas in which they were
established. In countries with high unemployment and where most of the
unemployed are women, sex work flourished, as it became a common means
for women to feed their families.

 

*/ What can be done to address African misconceptions of Africom/*

The U.S. needs to pay a keen attention to the following in order to
overcome the serious concerns that Africans have of Africom.

         Open dialogue with civil society on the rationale, mission
objectives and specific benefits that Africom would bring to the African
human security agenda.

         Demonstrate opportunities within the proposed structure that
would guarantee links with civil society to ensure participation and
contextual relevance. Additionally, reconceptualize Africom to
complement the African Standby Force and the work of the AU and Regional
Mechanisms to prevent, manage and resolves conflicts in Africa.

         Share the exit strategy and phase-out plans and the milestones
of Africom activities and encourage civil society to monitor them during
the implementation phase, with specific focus on their outcomes.

         Define, elaborate and clarify Africoms relationships with the
AU (Peace and Security Council, AU Commission) and Regional Mechanisms
for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

         Guarantee that the interests and sovereignty of African states
will not be compromised or undermined by Africom.

         Seek AU endorsement of Africom by the Executive Council and
the Assembly of the Heads of State and Government.

         Since Africom is viewed within the wider context of the Global
War on Terror and the likelihood of the theatre of terrorism shifting
from the Middle East to Africa, it may be wise to review the timing. It
could be even much better to wait until a time when the U.S. has an
administration that is not regarded as arrogant and uncaring about other
countries interests.

         Fully implement existing commitments, particularly the U.S.
foreign assistance and public diplomacy programs in Africa: AGOA, the
Presidents Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Presidents
Malaria Initiative (PMI), USAID programs/projects, etc.

         Last but not least, the U.S. should seriously think of
changing its international engagement and posture, which is increasingly
espousing American exceptionalism and unilateralism. Whatever the
virtues of the assault on Saddam Husseins Iraq, it, and its
consequences, have impacted very negatively on U.S. prestige. Most
African governments have expressed their deeply felt opposition to the
enterprise. Those that have not are often seen to be seeking U.S.
complicity in their own violations of human freedoms or hoping for some
form of reward for their silence. The refusal of the U.S. to countenance
the involvement of its armed forces in UN operations unless under U.S.
command is also irksome, as are insistences on exemptions for U.S.
citizens from prosecution in the ICC, and other objectionable elements
of Status of Forces Agreements.  This exceptionalism is also exhibited
in the way US embassies are built to appear like barracks barricading
American diplomats and making embassies no-go zones.

*/Conclusion/*

Africom will not be accepted in Africa if it does not take into account
the desires and aspirations of the African people for peace, security
and development. The policy that Africom aims to enhance should be
reflective of the African realities: growing multipartism and democratic
consolidation, the continuing quest for sustainable development, the
need to enhance state capacity, the craving for good governance,
promotion of human security, etc. Any foreign assistance to Africa must
incorporate these realities, as well as the desires and aspirations of
the African people. Africom will have a win/win outcome if it is
reflective of these facts and is presented as a mutually beneficial
partnership.

The hostility that it has faced so far points to the fact that Africom
could turn out to be an expensive endeavor, both in terms of resources
and long-term U.S.-Africa relations. It should not come as a surprise
that Washingtons designs for Africa are now viewed with skepticism.
Oil, China and terrorism are being seen to be the principal concerns of
the U.S. initiative. If the coordination of a securitized development
policy for Africa is part of the U.S. strategy, then it is seen by many
local observers as essentially secondary and subordinate to the main aim.

 

Thank you for the honor and opportunity to share with you my views on
this important issue. I would be more than glad to answer any question
that the Subcommittee may have.

 

